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Ambiguity is characterized as uncertainty about the probabilities with 
which outcomes can occur. Previous research has established that subjects, 
when given a choice between two options differing in their degree of ambi- 
guity, tend to prefer the less ambiguous option, exhibiting ambiguity avoid- 
ance. The present paper addresses the psychological sources of this behavior. 
Five plausible hypotheses for the basis of ambiguity avoidance were extracted 
from the literature, along with a sixth proposal which questioned the deliber- 
ateness of the behavior. None of the hypotheses had previously been suffi- 
ciently examined empirically. In a series of five experiments, each of the pro- 
posed explanations of ambiguity avoidance was tested. Of the six, only one, 
termed “other-evaluation,” had an effect on subjects’ choice behavior in an 
ambiguous situation involving monetary lotteries. The other-evaluation hy- 
pothesis states that a decision maker, in making a choice, anticipates that 
others will evaluate his or her decision; and, so, makes the choice that is 
perceived to be most justifiable to others. This choice is for the option having 
the smallest degree of ambiguity. It is concluded that the other-evaluation hy- 
pothesis offers the most promising direction for future research regarding the 
psychology of choice under ambiguity. 0 1986 Academic press, Inc. 
Suppose a patient must decide between two potential treatments. 
Treatment A has been used extensively, and there is substantial informa- 
tion that indicates its success rate to be 50%. Treatment B is new, and 
there is little information underlying the physician’s best guess that its 
chance of success is 50%. This situation, based upon an example first 
described by Keynes (1921), and again by Ellsberg (1961), demonstrates 
that two distinct types of uncertainty can be differentiated. The first type, 
present in both treatments, is uncertainty as to which outcome will 
occur: success or no success. The second type of uncertainty, present 
only in Treatment B, is uncertainty about the success probability itself, 
and is termed ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961). 
It has been conjectured that, given a choice between the two treat- 
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ments, many people would prefer Treatment A, exhibiting ambiguity 
avoidance. This claim, that individuals respond to ambiguity, rather than 
simply ignore it, has received substantial empirical support in a variety of 
contexts: choices among monetary lotteries (Becker & Brownson, 1964; 
Curley & Yates, 1985; Slavic & Tversky, 1974; Yates & Zukowski, 1976), 
foreign investment choices (MacCrimmon, 1968), clinical treatment 
choices (Curley, Eraker, & Yates, 1984; Hamm & Bursztajn, 1979), al- 
manac-type questions (Goldsmith & Sahlin, 1982), judgments of likeli- 
hood based on inference (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985), and insurance deci- 
sions (Hogarth & Kunreuther, 1984, 1985). 
What has not been demonstrated is what underlies the observed be- 
havior: Specifically, why is ambiguity avoided? What prompts or moti- 
vates subjects to avoid ambiguity? It is to this question that the present 
research was addressed. The significance of the issue lies both in the 
prevalence of ambiguity in real-life decision situations and in the paucity 
of empirical work in this area. 
Clearly, ambiguity is present in many decision situations. In real life, 
we rarely know what the outcome probabilities are. A better under- 
standing of ambiguity and ambiguity reactions would be a valuable bridge 
between the theory and application of decision research. Yet, current em- 
pirical knowledge regarding this question is sparse. Although lacking em- 
pirical foundations, our efforts did not lack background altogether. The 
literature is replete with hypothesized sources of ambiguity avoidance 
which, although not empirically substantiated, are theoretically and/or 
intuitively reasonable. Specifically, five categories of proposed explana- 
tions are identifiable in the literature. We now discuss each hypothesis in 
turn. Included with each hypothesis is a list of references in which the 
hypothesis was proposed; unless indicated, these proposals were not ac- 
companied by empirical support. 
1. Hostile nature (Yates & Zukowski, 1975). The hostile nature hy- 
pothesis conjectures that subjects perceive that the process by which the 
outcomes are determined is nonrandom for the ambiguous option. In- 
stead, the outcome is perceived to be the result of a process which is 
antagonistic, or at least competitive, toward themselves. The less favor- 
able outcome in the ambiguous situation is perceived as more likely than 
the more favorable outcome, and thus the ambiguous option is avoided. 
Related hypotheses are that subjects reason that it is better to have 
more information than less (Roberts, 1963), or that subjects perceive the 
situation as one over which they have little control (Langer, 1975). The 
rationale is that, when information is hidden or when control of the situa- 
tion is out of one’s hands, conditions are typically biased against one. It 
is possible, then, that subjects perceive the ambiguous option as biased 
against them and therefore to be avoided. 
2. Other-evaluation (Ellsberg, 1963; Fellner, 1961; Gardenfors, 1979: 
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Knight, 1921; Roberts, 1963; Toda & Shuford, 1965). In making a deci- 
sion under ambiguity, the decision maker might anticipate that the deci- 
sion will be evaluated by others. According to the other-evaluation hy- 
pothesis, a choice is made which the decision maker perceives as most 
justifiable to those others who will evaluate the decision. This hypothesis 
is similar in nature to that proposed by Slavic (1975) and colleagues 
(Slavic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982) in the context of risky choice. 
The anticipated evaluation by others may be explicit, in that the decision 
maker is responsible to someone else, whether a superior, peers, or oth- 
erwise; or the anticipated evaluation may be implicit, in that others will 
be observing the decision, and the decision maker desires to appear com- 
petent. 
3. Self-evaluation (Ellsberg, 1963; Hamm & Bursztajn, 1979; Roberts, 
1963; Toda & Shuford, 296.5). The self-evaluation hypothesis is similar to 
the other-evaluation hypothesis. Instead of anticipating an evaluation by 
others, the decision maker anticipates the future self-evaluation of the 
decision. This approach is a recognition by the decision maker of the 
“strategy of evaluating his past decisions in order to improve his future 
decisions” (Toda & Shuford, 1965, p. 247). The notion is related to the 
concepts of choice regret and anxiety (Bell, 1982, 1983), in that these 
reactions result from the evaluation of one’s own decisions, and are af- 
fected by anticipated feedback. 
4. Forced choice (Roberts, 1963). The forced-choice hypothesis states 
that the less ambiguous option is selected only when all other consider- 
ations are equal. Ambiguity is a second dimension in a lexicographic de- 
cision rule which is used since the task is a forced choice; however, the 
decision maker would not actually pay to obtain the chosen option over 
the unchosen one. 
Both Becker and Brownson (1964) and Yates and Zukowski (1976) pre- 
sented contradictory evidence for this hypothesis by obtaining cash 
equivalents for ambiguous and nonambiguous gambles. All of these 
gambles were constructed to have an equal subjective probability 50 of 
success or no success. Both studies found that the mean cash equivalent 
value given to the more ambiguous lottery was less than that given to the 
less ambiguous lottery. This result strongly suggests that subjects would 
indeed pay to receive their preferred option, in contradiction of the 
forced-choice hypothesis. One difficulty in interpreting the results of 
these studies is that the procedure of eliciting cash equivalents that was 
used in both studies is a pricing task and may not be generalizable to the 
choice situation. Several studies have shown that different preferences 
sometimes obtain, depending on whether a choice task or a pricing task is 
used (Goldstein, 1984; Grether & Plott, 1979; Lichtenstein & Slavic, 
1971). 
5. Uncertainty avoidance. The uncertainty avoidance hypothesis states 
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that ambiguity avoidance is a consequence of a more general attitude of 
uncertainty avoidance. Although not fully explanatory, this hypothesis 
attempts at least to clarify the behavior itself. Accordingly, this hy- 
pothesis would predict that those who avoid ambiguity should also ex- 
hibit an avoidance of other aspects of uncertainty. For example, risk 
aversion, the preference for a guaranteed amount over an uncertain 
gamble with equal expectation, should correlate with the avoidance of 
ambiguity. An example of a common mechanism underlying uncertainty 
reactions is that of a utility, or disutility, for gambling. This concept has 
been applied to risk-avoiding and risk-seeking behaviors (Fellner, 1961; 
Fishburn, 1980); and may operate in the ambiguous situation, also. 
Other explanations. Another hypothesis regarding ambiguity avoid- 
ance arises from an ongoing debate concerning the normativeness of any 
type of reaction to ambiguity. This debate can be briefly outlined as 
follows. Ellsberg (1961) demonstrated that any reaction to ambiguity, 
whether ambiguity avoiding or ambiguity seeking, is inconsistent with 
even a qualitative probability measure of uncertainty. Consequently, 
Ellsberg, as did Knight (1921), questioned the adequacy of probability as 
a measure of the totality of decision uncertainty. This stance clearly con- 
tradicts the normative status of probability theory implicit in statistical 
decision theory (DeGroot, 1970; Winkler, 1972), as based upon expected 
utility theory (Lute & Raiffa, 1957; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). 
or the more general subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1972). 
In response to this criticism, proponents of statistical decision theory 
advanced a sixth proposal, which is to question the relevance of ambi- 
guity avoidance (Hamm & Bursztajn, 1979; Roberts, 1963; Savage, 1972). 
According to this “mistake hypothesis,” in expressing a preference for 
the less ambiguous option, subjects are making a nonconscious, system- 
atic error which, if sufficiently understood, they would correct. This ar- 
gument is similar to that advanced in support of transitivity in preference 
patterns. Subjects typically do wish to correct their responses so as to 
remove intransitivities, which they exhibit with certain elicitation proce- 
dures, when these intransitivities are identified to them (MacCrimmon. 
1968; Tversky, 1969). 
Underlying the mistake hypothesis are the various “Dutch book” ar- 
guments which have been advanced by proponents of statistical decision 
theory (Raiffa, 1961; Roberts, 1963; Savage, 1972; Winkler, 1972). A 
Dutch book is a series of bets in which the person is sure to lose because 
his or her beliefs or preferences violate a certain principle. If such is the 
case, the person is clearly behaving irrationally and should correct the 
error. Several authors have demonstrated how Dutch books can be con- 
structed at the expense of individuals whose probability judgments are 
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not additive (Winkler, 1972), or who exhibit the conjunction fallacy 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), or whose probability judgment revisions 
are non-Bayesian (Freedman & Purves, 1969). However, as argued in 
Fellner (1961), a Dutch book based on ambiguity preferences, without 
arguable assumptions, has not yet been advanced. The reluctance of sub- 
jects to alter their ambiguity-avoiding behavior after the presentation of 
prescriptive counterarguments (MacCrimmon, 1968; MacCrimmon & 
Larsson, 1979; Slavic & Tversky, 1974) further weakens the claim that, 
upon reflection, people consider ambiguity preferences to be mistakes. 
Finally, in addition to these proposed explanations of ambiguity avoid- 
ance, there exist a variety of comments which were meant as merely 
illustrative, rather than psychologically informative. For example, it has 
been stated that ambiguity leads to low confidence (Becker & Brownson, 
1964; Knight, 1921); however, this is not offered as an explanation, and 
should not be so interpreted. Such a comment helps illustrate ambiguity 
reactions without answering the question: Why should this be so? Similar 
statements are that an ambiguous option has a more volatile probability 
of success (Ellsberg, 1961; Roberts, 1963) or that ambiguity is avoided 
when the outcomes at stake are of importance (Fellner, 1961; Hamm & 
Bursztajn, 1979). Propositions such as these tend to be tautological in 
content, serving as attempts to clarify the definitions, stating that an am- 
biguous option is avoided because it is more uncertain. The comments 
are not sufficient as explanations, and should not be interpreted as ex- 
planatory. 
Returning then to the hypothesized explanations of ambiguity avoid- 
ance, our intent was to investigate the proposals. As we have pointed 
out, the proposals have all been advanced as sources of ambiguity avoid- 
ance; and, as we have argued, each is a reasonable explanation of the 
phenomenon. Still, the hypotheses have been largely untested. Our goal 
was to derive necessary implications for each hypothesis, and then to 
empirically determine the validity of these implications. To the extent 
that the implications are not verified, doubt is cast upon the hypotheses 
having those implications. Naturally, we would not expect that all the 
explanations would hold. That is to say that the null hypothesis, that an 
explanation is not valid, was not expected to be rejected in all cases. 
These null results are included as important evidence regarding the inade- 
quacy of the associated proposed explanations of ambiguity avoidance. 
The remainder of this paper presents, and discusses the implications 
of, the experiments that were designed to illuminate the question, “Why 
is ambiguity avoided?” We begin by describing the choice situation that 
was used to test the proposed explanations, and then present five experi- 
ments in detail. Experiments 1-4 considered the five plausible explana- 
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tions of ambiguity avoidance; Experiment 5 tested the viability of the 
mistake hypothesis. 
GENERALPROCEDURE 
To test the hypotheses, subjects were asked to evaluate, and indicate 
their preference between, two lotteries. The two lotteries were essen- 
tially the same for each experiment, and are described here in the form 
used for Experiment 1. Changes in the lotteries within the other studies 
are noted where appropriate. Each lottery involved risk, in that two out- 
comes were possible-a player might win $5 or nothing. The lotteries 
differed in their degree of ambiguity. For one, the player knew precisely 
what the probabilities of each outcome were. For the other, the proba- 
bilities were not precisely specified; the lottery was ambiguous. The lot- 
teries were adapted from ones first introduced by Keynes (1921) and later 
elaborated by Ellsberg (1961). They are illustrated in Fig. 1 and worked 
as follows. 
For each lottery the player was to select a poker chip from a bag 
without looking. The nonambiguous Lottery 1 bag had a known composi- 
tion of 50 red and 50 white poker chips; the ambiguous Lottery 2 bag 
contained 100 red and/or white chips in an unspecified distribution. The 
player was allowed to name the “valuable” chip color, either red or 
white, draw one chip from the bag without looking, and would win $5 if 
the selected chip was valuable, and nothing otherwise. For all experi- 
ments, the poker chips, bags, and some form of display, like that in Fig. 
1, were in full view of the subjects when the lotteries were explained. 
Since the two lotteries were otherwise identical, any differences in a 
subject’s evaluation of the lotteries could be attributed to the difference 
in their ambiguity. Thus, the degree of ambiguity avoidance could be op- 
erationalized as the degree to which subjects preferred the nonambiguous 
Lottery 1 over the ambiguous Lottery 2. This operational variable was 
related to various dependent variables in the experiments, in tests of nec- 
essary implications of each hypothesis. 
Lottery 1 Lottery 2 
pif&?qm 
1. Choose odor. 
2. cfow one chip. 
3. win $5 if correcl cdor. 
FIG. 1. Schematic descriptions of Lottery 1, Lottery 2, and the playing procedure of 
each. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to study the relationship between prefer- 
ences for risk and ambiguity in order to determine the validity of the 
uncertainty avoidance hypothesis (Hypothesis 5). If a common mecha- 
nism underlies responses to risk and ambiguity, an individual’s response 
to the uncertainty of risk, i.e., uncertainty as to which outcome will 
occur, should be related to his or her response to the additional uncer- 
tainty present in an ambiguous option. For example, a person who avoids 
the uncertainty of risk would be expected to also avoid the uncertainty of 
ambiguity. Lotteries 1 and 2 (Fig. 1) were the lotteries used in the study. 
Method 
Subjects. Twenty-six University of Michigan undergraduates enrolled 
in an introductory psychology course served as subjects. The experi- 
mental task was presented to them in a single group session. 
Procedure. Following a verbal explanation of Lottery 1, a cash equiva- 
lent was obtained for each subject, using a procedure introduced by 
Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964). The cash equivalent was de- 
scribed as the smallest amount of money the subject would accept in 
exchange for the opportunity to play the lottery in his or her possession, 
that is, a minimum selling price for Lottery 1. Also indicated was that, 
after the subject stated this price, the experimenter would offer the sub- 
ject a buying price. The buying price would be randomly selected from a 
bag containing 101 blue poker chips labeled in 5$ increments, from $0 to 
$5. If the amount on the chip was equal to or greater than the player’s 
reported selling price, the player would receive the buying price and 
would not play the lottery. Otherwise, the player would play the lottery 
and either win $5 or nothing, depending on the outcome. Two display 
boards were used to explain this procedure and to demonstrate that it 
was in the subject’s best interests to report a true, unbiased selling price, 
since the buying price would be determined independently of the selling 
price. 
Lottery 2 was described next. Subjects were asked to select the lottery, 
either Lottery 1 or Lottery 2, that they would prefer to play, given the 
choice of one. Subjects then recorded their minimum selling prices for 
Lottery 2. Once again, they were cautioned against reporting a biased 
price. 
Following this, each subject recorded the reason for his or her choice 
between Lotteries 1 and 2, being as complete as possible. Three subjects 
were then randomly selected to either play their chosen lottery or accept 
the experimenter’s buying price for that lottery. This procedure had been 
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described to them before making their responses. Where applicable, the 
winnings were distributed at that time. 
Measures. In order to test the hypothesis of the relationship between 
risk and ambiguity preferences, the following measures of these con- 
structs were used. First, each subject’s risk preference was determined to 
be one of the following (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976): (1) risk avoiding if the 
cash equivalent for Lottery 1 was less than the expected outcome of Lot- 
tery 1, $2.50; (2) risk neutral if the cash equivalent was equal to $2.50; 
and (3) risk seeking if the cash equivalent was greater than $2.50. Simi- 
larly, each subject’s ambiguity preference was classified. Since Lottery 2 
was just as “risky” as Lottery 1, in that the outcomes were uncertain for 
both lotteries, ambiguity preference was measured as a difference be- 
tween the responses to the two lotteries. Specifically, subjects were clas- 
sifed as (1) ambiguity avoiding if the Lottery 2 cash equivalent was less 
than the cash equivalent for Lottery 1; (2) ambiguity neutral if the cash 
equivalents were equal; and (3) ambiguity seeking if the Lottery 2 cash 
equivalent was greater than the cash equivalent for Lottery 1. If risk and 
ambiguity attitudes are governed by some common factor, then we would 
expect a majority of subjects to have the same risk and ambiguity prefer- 
ence classification, for example, being both risk and ambiguity avoiding. 
A more sensitive test of the relationship between risk and ambiguity 
attitudes is based on quantitative measures of these preferences. For 
each subject, a risk premium, defined as the expectation of the risky lot- 
tery, $2.50, minus the cash equivalent for that lottery, was calculated 
(Pratt, 1964). A subject who was classified as risk avoiding would have a 
positive risk premium, with the magnitude of the premium providing a 
measure of the degree of risk avoidance. Intuitively, the risk premium is 
the amount of expected winnings that the subject is willing to relinquish 
in order to avoid the riskiness of the lottery. Similarly, the ambiguity 
premium for each subject was calculated as the Lottery 1 cash equivalent 
minus the Lottery 2 cash equivalent. A subject classified as ambiguity 
avoiding would have a positive ambiguity premium. The magnitude of the 
ambiguity premium provides a measure of the expected winnings that a 
subject is willing to relinquish in order to avoid the additional uncertainty 
of the ambiguous Lottery 2. If risk and ambiguity attitudes are governed 
by some common factor, then we would expect risk premiums and ambi- 
guity premiums to be positively correlated. 
There is a difficulty in interpreting the correlation between the two 
premiums, however, which is illustrated in Fig. 2. The difficulty is that 
when the subject gives a price for Lottery 1 that is different than $2.50- 
that is, when the risk premium is nonzero-the range for the ambiguity 
premium is asymmetric about zero. For example, suppose a subject says 
that his or her minimum selling price for Lottery 1 is $2. This implies a 
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-$5.00 4 
-$2.50 SO *Go 
Risk Pnmium 
FIG. 2. Graph of the risk and ambiguity premiums for Lotteries 1 and 2 of Fig. 1. The 
shaded region represents the possible values of each of the premiums. Risk neutrality ob- 
tains when the risk premium is zero, and positive risk premiums imply risk-avoiding be- 
havior. Similarly, ambiguity neutrality obtains when the ambiguity premium is zero, and 
positive ambiguity premiums imply ambiguity-avoiding behavior. 
risk premium of $0.50, a risk-avoiding response. As Fig. 2 indicates, 
given this risk premium, the ambiguity premium must lie within the in- 
terval [ - $3, $21. As a result, the subinterval within which ambiguity 
seeking can be expressed, [ - $3, $O), has a larger range than the subin- 
terval within which ambiguity avoiding can be expressed, ($0, $21. In 
general, these subintervals will always have unequal ranges, whenever 
the subject is not risk neutral. 
Consequently, as indicated by the shaded region of Fig. 2, which repre- 
sents the space of possible values for the two premium measures, the 
premiums are biased toward being negatively correlated. To compensate 
for this bias, a normalized ambiguity premium was also calculated for 
each subject. This premium was a two-piece linear transformation of the 
ambiguity premium to the interval [ - 1, I], with - 1 representing max- 
imal ambiguity seeking, 1 representing maximal ambiguity avoiding, and 
0 representing ambiguity neutrality. 
Results and Discussion 
The joint frequencies of risk preferences and ambiguity preferences are 
shown in Table 1. Due to several small cell sizes, the neutral and seeking 
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TABLE 1 
FREQUENCIES OF RISK AND AMBIGUITY PREFERENCE CLASSIFICATIONS (EXPERIMENT 1) 
Risk Risk Risk 
avoiding neutral seeking Total 
Ambiguity avoiding 7 4 6 17 
Ambiguity neutral 1 2 2 5 
Ambiguity seeking 3 0 1 4 
Total 11 6 9 26 
categories were combined for statistical analysis, collapsing Table 1 into a 
2 x 2 table. The analysis did not allow rejection of the independence of 
risk preferences and ambiguity preferences (x2[1] = 0.03, p > .8). In 
addition, the correlation between risk premiums and ambiguity premiums 
did not achieve significance (r[24] = - .19, p > .3), nor did that between 
risk premiums and normalized ambiguity premiums (r[24] = . 11, p > .5). 
The results clearly fail to support the hypothesis of a general attitude 
toward uncertainty (Hypothesis 5) in that subjects’ responses to risk and 
ambiguity were independent. This suggests that ambiguity avoidance is 
distinct from risk avoidance. One difftculty with this conclusion is the 
lower power of the test, which results from the relatively small sample 
size. This limitation is addressed in Experiment 2. 
Further analyses indicated that neither risk seeking nor risk avoiding 
predominated, based on the mean risk premium (t[25] = -0.23, p > .8), 
and the risk preference data in Table 1 (binomial test, p > .8). For ambi- 
guity, avoidance predominated, as measured by either the nonnormalized 
(t[25] = 3.46, p < .Ol), or the normalized ambiguity premium (t[25] = 
3.79, p < .OOl). The choice data also support this finding, in that signifi- 
cantly more ambiguity-avoiding choices were made than ambiguity- 
seeking ones (binomial test, p < .Ol). This result replicates those of 
Becker and Brownson (1964) and Yates and Zukowski (1976), in contra- 
diction of the forced-choice hypothesis (Hypothesis 4): Using a pricing 
task, subjects set a lower value for the ambiguous option than for the 
nonambiguous option, suggesting that they would pay to avoid ambiguity. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to both test the hostile nature explanation 
(Hypothesis 1) for ambiguity avoidance and provide increased statistical 
power for Experiment 1. The hostile nature hypothesis would predict 
that, among those subjects who believe that the ambiguous option is, or 
may be, biased against them, ambiguity avoidance would prevail. How- 
ever, among those who do not believe the possibility of bias, ambiguity 
neutrality should obtain. The hypothesis was tested using Lotteries 1 and 
240 CURLEY, YATES, AND ABRAMS 
2 (Fig. l), while forcing subjects to explicitly consider the possibility of 
bias in the ambiguous Lottery 2. 
Method 
Subjects. Two sessions were used, a manipulation session involving 20 
subjects, and a control session involving 19 subjects. Subjects in both 
sessions were recruited from an introductory psychology class at the 
University of Michigan. They were not paid for their participation, but 
had a chance to play one of the lotteries following the experiment, and 
thereby possibly win $5. 
Procedure. Both the control and the manipulation conditions began 
with an explanation of the bag composition and playing procedure for the 
ambiguous game, Lottery 2. Following this, the manipulation group en- 
gaged in a task which was omitted from the control group. 
The manipulation group subjects were instructed to imagine them- 
selves as the “managers” of Lottery 2. They were to consider how they 
would set the composition of Bag 2; and, particularly, if they thought it 
were “possible to set the composition of Bag 2 so that, no matter what 
color the player selects, the lottery would be biased against the player.” 
The subjects recorded their beliefs as to the possibility of such a bias; 
and, then, to assure their deliberation, each recorded an explanation for 
his or her response. Finally, the manipulation group indicated how they 
would set the composition of Bag 2. This was to test for the presence of a 
color bias that might influence their responses. 
The remainder of the procedure was the same for both the control and 
manipulation groups. Lottery 1 was described to the subjects. Each sub- 
ject indicated a forced-choice preference for either Lottery 1 or Lottery 
2, and provided minimum selling prices for each of these lotteries. Buying 
prices, to be offered by the experimenter as in Experiment 1, were de- 
scribed, stressing the independence of their determination from the sub- 
jects’ selling prices. 
Following these responses, one subject in each group was selected to 
play his or her preferred lottery, receiving $5 or nothing, or to accept the 
buying price for that lottery, depending on his or her selling price. This 
procedure was explained to the subjects before their choices and min- 
imum selling prices were requested. 
Results and Discussion 
No color preference was obtained in the subject-proposed composi- 
tions of Bag 2, either overall or within the bias or no-bias subgroups (e.g., 
t[18] = .89 for the overall group, p > .3 for all tests). Of the 20 subjects in 
the manipulation group, only 6 (30%) believed that Bag 2’s contents could 
be biased against the player. More to the point, all of the 14 subjects who 
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did not believe that bias was possible selected the less ambiguous Lottery 
1 (binomial test, p < .OOl). This was an even greater extent of ambiguity 
avoidance than obtained among the 6 who believed that bias was possible 
(66.7%, binomial, p > .6), which is exactly opposite the prediction of the 
hostile nature hypothesis. The control subjects showed an intermediate 
amount of ambiguity avoidance (68.4%, p > .I). Overall, there was signif- 
icant ambiguity avoidance (79.5%, p < .OOOl). 
As a more sensitive test, a risk premium, ambiguity premium, and nor- 
malized ambiguity premium (see Experiment 1) were calculated for each 
subject. The risk premiums did not differ from zero for any subgrouping 
of the subjects, nor did the subgroups differ from one another. Of interest 
in the present study are the non-normalized and normalized ambiguity 
premiums, which corroborated the choice data. Among those who stated 
that no bias was possible, the mean ambiguity premium was .68 (t[13] = 
2.43, p < .05) and the mean normalized ambiguity premium was .24 (r[13] 
= 2.64, p < .OS), indicative of significant ambiguity avoidance. Among 
those who stated that bias was possible, the mean ambiguity premium 
was .I3 (t[5] = 0.19, p > .8) and the mean normalized ambiguity pre- 
mium was .07 (t[5] = 0.33, p > .7), indicative of ambiguity neutrality. 
The mean ambiguity premium among control subjects was .42 (t[lS] = 
1.59, p > . l), and the mean normalized ambiguity premium was .18 (t[ 181 
= 1.81, p > .05). Further, these premiums did not differ significantly 
from the corresponding premiums of the no-bias manipulation subgroup 
(largest t[24] = 0.68, p > .5 for both tests). 
Thus, the hostile nature hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) was not substan- 
tiated in the present experiment. The hypothesis predicted that, among 
those subjects who were convinced that the ambiguous bag’s contents 
could not be biased against them, ambiguity neutrality should have pre- 
dominated. Instead, significant ambiguity avoidance obtained for these 
subjects. Also predicted was that the control group should have exhibited 
greater ambiguity avoidance than the manipulation group that claimed no 
possible bias. Instead, these two groups were equivalent in their ambi- 
guity avoidance. 
In addition, the present results replicate those of Experiment 1 with 
respect to the uncertainty avoidance hypothesis (Hypothesis 5), while 
adding greater statistical power to that study. Combining the data of this 
experiment with the data of Experiment 1, the correlations were still not 
significant, either between risk premiums and ambiguity premiums (r 1631 
= - .15, p > .2), or between risk premiums and normalized ambiguity 
premiums (r[63] = . 11, p > .7). The combined data of Experiments 1 and 
2 do not indicate the presence of a general avoidance of uncertainty, of 
which ambiguity avoidance is a specific instance, in that there is not a 
significant correlation between risk avoidance and ambiguity avoidance. 
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EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiment 3 was designed as a test of the forced-choice hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 4), which proposes that subjects only avoid ambiguity be- 
cause the task is a forced choice between otherwise equivalent options. 
Presumably, if the options were not otherwise equivalent, subjects would 
not avoid the ambiguous one. To test the hypothesis, four lotteries were 
constructed, and a choice task used. This methodology differed from that 
in previous studies, including Experiments 1 and 2, which used selling 
prices obtained in a pricing task as evidence against the forced-choice 
hypothesis (Becker & Brownson, 1964; Yates & Zukowski, 1976). Given 
the possibility that the choice task and pricing task may not be psycho- 
logically comparable, the present study more directly pertains to the 
choice situation, which is our focal concern. 
Two groups of subjects participated in the study. Each group evaluated 
four lotteries. For Group A, two of the lotteries were Lotteries 1 and 2 in 
Fig. 1. Lotteries 3 and 4 were equivalent to Lotteries 1 and 2, respec- 
tively, except that the amount to be won was $4.99, rather than $5. The 
lotteries considered by Group B subjects were the same as those seen by 
Group A subjects, except that, for Lotteries 1 and 2 the amount to be 
won was $10, rather than $5, and for Lotteries 3 and 4 the prize was 
$9.99, instead of $4.99. The forced-choice hypothesis predicts that, for 
each group, both Lottery 1 and Lottery 2 should be preferred to both 
Lottery 3 and Lottery 4, since the former lotteries have the higher expec- 
tation. This is a consequence of using a lexicographic decision rule, 
wherein the amount of ambiguity is the second dimension being consid- 
ered, and expectation is the first dimension. 
Method: Group A 
Subjects. Sixteen University of Michigan undergraduates were re- 
cruited from a paid subject pool maintained by the Psychology Depart- 
ment. The experiment was presented to groups of 3-4 subjects, along 
with several other unrelated tasks. 
Procedure. The lotteries’ playing procedure was described using Lot- 
teries 1 and 2 as examples. The subject’s task was to express his or her 
preferences among the four lotteries. After describing the procedure, the 
response sheets were distributed and their graphical displays explained. 
The subjects were informed that none of the lotteries would actually be 
played; they were hypothetical. However, recall that the subjects were 
paid for their participation in the session, and were believed to be moti- 
vated to be reliable. Each subject ranked the four lotteries in order of 
decreasing preference, from 1 to 4. 
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TABLE 2 
PREFERENCE ORDERINGS, AND THEIR FREQUENCIES, FOR LOTTERIES 1-4 
(EXPERIMENT 3) 
Pattern 
Classification 
Ambiguity avoiding, 
nonlexicographic 
Ambiguity avoiding, 
lexicographic 
Ambiguity seeking, 
nonlexicographic 
Ambiguity seeking, 
lexicographic 
Other 
Most Least 
preferred preferred Frequency 
I 3 2 4 35 
1 2 3 4 4 
2 4 1 3 5 
2 1 4 3 3 
1 2 4 3 0 
2 1 3 4 0 
Method: Group B 
Subjects. Thirty-one unpaid undergraduates participated in fulfillment 
of a requirement of the introductory psychology courses at the Univer- 
sity. They received the task, along with several different unrelated tasks, 
in individual sessions. 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that for Group A, except 
that the four lottery displays were presented on index cards which the 
subject ordered according to preference. Although not paid, the subjects 
were given the chance to actually play several of the lotteries from the 
session, and were so informed before performing the experimental task. 
Results and Discussion 
There were no statistically reliable differences between the responses 
of Groups A and B, so the data are presented together. There are six 
plausible orderings of the four lotteries that satisfy the dominance condi- 
tions of Lottery 1 being preferred to Lottery 3 and Lottery 2 being pre- 
ferred to Lottery 4. All of the orderings subjects reported were among 
these six. The plausible orderings are listed in Table 2, along with their 
frequencies of occurrence in the sample. Also shown is the classification 
of each pattern as either ambiguity avoiding or ambiguity seeking, and as 
either lexicographic or not. The six orderings were not observed equally 
often (x*[S] = 115.77, p < .OOl), the number of nonlexicographic, ambi- 
guity-avoiding patterns being the only pattern that exceeded a chance 
rate of occurrence (74.5%, binomial test, p < .OOl>. Also of note, the total 
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number of nonlexicographic patterns significantly exceeded the number 
of lexicographic patterns (binomial test, p < .OOl). 
The results do not support the forced-choice hypothesis (Hypothesis 4) 
with this choice task. Subjects did not prefer both Lotteries 1 and 2 to 
both Lotteries 3 and 4, despite the fact that the lotteries were not iden- 
tical except for ambiguity. Even in the choice task used, subjects were 
willing to pay to avoid ambiguity, tending to prefer both nonambiguous 
lotteries, 1 and 3, to the ambiguous lotteries, 2 and 4. Thus, the present 
results are consistent with the pricing results using cash equivalents, as 
described in Experiments 1 and 2, in contradiction of the forced-choice 
hypothesis. l 
EXPERIMENT 4 
The other-evaluation hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) and the self-evaluation 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) were jointly tested in a 2 x 2 between-subjects 
design. The other-evaluation hypothesis proposes that subjects avoid am- 
biguity in anticipation of an evaluation of their decisions by other people. 
Thus, the hypothesis would predict a stronger reaction to ambiguity 
among a group of subjects whose choices are made publicly rather than 
privately, in that an evaluation by others is more salient and probable 
under conditions of public choice. The self-evaluation hypothesis pro- 
poses that a subject anticipates a future evaluation of the decision by 
oneself. Such an evaluation is possible only with the anticipation of rele- 
vant feedback. Consequently, the self-evaluation hypothesis implies that 
a stronger reaction to ambiguity should obtain among a group of subjects 
for whom the contents of the ambiguous bag are to be exposed, than 
among those for whom the contents are not to be exposed, since they are 
more likely to anticipate the possibilities of evaluation and regret. Lot- 
teries 1 and 2 (Fig. 1) were used to test these hypotheses. 
Method 
Subjects. One hundred thirty-six undergraduates were recruited from a 
t Although not relevant for an evaluation of the forced-choice hypothesis, one could in 
turn ask the question: Using the choice paradigm, how much are subjects willing to pay to 
avoid ambiguity? The subjects in Group B were presented with additional choices which 
allowed an estimation of this quantity. A lower bound was determined for the mean amount 
that subjects were willing to give up, when Lotteries 1 and 2 involved a prize of $10, by 
varying the winning prize for Lotteries 3 and 4. Subjects, on average, would trade off $0.65 
to avoid ambiguity in this situation, indicating significant ambiguity avoidance (t[30] = 3.19, 
p < .Ol). Further details regarding the procedure of this manipulation are presented else- 
where (Curley, 1986). The value of $0.65 is comparable to that obtained with a pricing 
procedure by Yates and Zukowski (1976)-$0.10 when the prize was $I-and Experiments 
1 and 2-$0.48 when the prize was $5. 
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paid subject pool operated by the Psychology Department. The experi- 
ment was conducted in groups of 3-5 subjects, along with several unre- 
lated tasks. One subject from each group played his or her preferred lot- 
tery, receiving either $5 or nothing, depending on the outcome. 
Procedure. Two factors were manipulated in the experiment in a 2 x 2 
design. The first factor was the other-evaluation factor and the second 
was the self-evaluation factor; each had a “high” and a “low” level. In 
the high-other-evaluation conditions, it was understood that the subject 
selected to play a lottery would announce his or her choice and play that 
lottery in front of the entire group of subjects-publicly. In the low>- 
other-evaluation conditions, it was understood that the selected subject 
would remain after the experiment and play the lottery after the others 
had left. In the high-self-evaluation conditions, the contents of the ambig- 
uous bag, the bag for Lottery 2, were exposed immediately after the sub- 
ject played his or her chosen lottery. In the low-self-evaluation condi- 
tions, it was made clear that the contents of the ambiguous bag would 
never be known to any of the subjects. 
All four experimental conditions began with identical descriptions of 
Lotteries 1 and 2. Following this, in the low-self-evaluation conditions 
only, it was explained that the contents of the ambiguous bag would 
never be known to the subjects, not even after the experiment. 
The playing procedure was then presented, a different display board 
and playing procedure being used for each of the four conditions of the 
design. The summaries of the playing procedures, as they appeared on 
the display boards, appear in Table 3. In all conditions, the first two steps 
of the procedure were for each subject to respond and then for one of the 
subjects in that group to be selected at random. 
The remaining steps of the playing procedures differed among the four 
conditions. As Table 3 shows, in the high-other-evaluation conditions, the 
lottery was to be played immediately after the player was selected. In the 
low-other-evaluation conditions, the playing of the lottery was to be de- 
layed until the experiment’s end, after the other subjects had left. After 
the lottery was to be played, the high-self-evaluation conditions required 
the exposure of the contents of the ambiguous bag. The contents were to 
be shown to everyone in the high-self-evaluation/high-other-evaluation 
condition, and only to the player in the high-self-evaluation/low-other- 
evaluation condition, since only that subject would be present in the 
latter case. This verification of the ambiguous bag’s contents was explic- 
itly omitted in the low-self-evaluation conditions; instead, the subjects 
were reminded of the fairness of the game as guaranteed by the playing 
procedure. 
After having the applicable playing procedure clarified, the subjects 
received their response sheets and indicated which of the two lotteries 
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TABLE 3 
SUMMARIES OF THE PLAYING PROCEDURES BY EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION 
(EXPERIMENT 4) 
High self-evaluation Low self-evaluation 
High 
other- 
evaluation 
1. You choose either 
Lottery 1 or Lottery 2 
2. One person is selected 
randomly to play a 
lottery at that time 
3. That person plays 
his/her chosen lottery 
and receives the payoff 
of either $5 or nothing 
4. The bag for Lottery 2 
is emptied for 
everyone to see 
Low 
other- 
evaluation 
1. You choose either 
Lottery 1 or Lottery 2 
2. One person is selected 
randomly to remain 
after everyone else 
has left 
3. That person plays 
his/her chosen lottery 
and receives the payoff 
of either $5 or nothing 
4. The bag for Lottery 2 
is emptied for 
that person to see 
1. You choose either 
Lottery 1 or Lottery 2 
2. One person is selected 
randomly to play a 
lottery at that time 
3. That person plays 
his/her chosen lottery 
and receives the payoff 
of either $5 or nothing 
1. You choose either 
Lottery 1 or Lottery 2 
2. One person is selected 
3. That person plays 
randomly to remain 
his/her chosen lottery 
and receives the payoff 
after everyone else 
of either $5 or nothing 
has left 
they preferred. This was a forced-choice task. A strength of preference 
was then rated on a scale with anchors identified with the two lotteries. 
Ratings were used so as to avoid the difficulty of the asymmetry of the 
ambiguity premium as a measure of ambiguity avoidance, as was de- 
scribed in the context of Experiment 1. The ratings were coded on a scale 
of 1 to 7 in the analyses, with 1 representing maximal ambiguity seeking, 
4 representing ambiguity neutrality, and 7 representing maximal ambi- 
guity avoiding. Finally, the responses were collected and the appropriate 
playing procedure was enacted as described. 
Results and Discussion 
No effect was found for differing group sizes on either the ratings or the 
choices. The percentage of ambiguity-avoiding choices and the mean 
strength of preference rating for each condition are shown in Fig. 3. A 
multidimensional test of independence, applied to the choice data, re- 
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FIG. 3. Percentage of ambiguity-avoiding choices and mean strength of preference rating 
for the four experimental conditions of Experiment 4. A higher rating indicates greater 
ambiguity avoidance. 
vealed no significant dependencies (x*[4] = 1.67, p > .7). However, as 
Fig. 3 indicates, the pattern of the results was identical for the choice and 
rating data. A two-way analysis of variance applied to the latter indicated 
a significant effect of the other-evaluation factor (F[l,llO] = 6.14, p < 
.05); but not significant were the self-evaluation factor (F[l,llO] = 0.08, 
p > .7) and the interaction of these factors (F[l,l lo] = 0.63, p > .4). All 
four conditions exhibited significant ambiguity avoidance, both in the 
choice data (binomial test, p < .05 for all tests) and in the rating data 
(minimum t[26], = 2.79, p < .Ol for all tests, smallest df = 26). 
Clearly, the present experiment indicates no support for the self-evalu- 
ation hypothesis (Hypothesis 3). Those subjects who could anticipate the 
revelation of the contents of the ambiguous bag, for whom regret was 
possible, did not exhibit greater ambiguity avoidance than those subjects 
in the low-self-evaluation conditions, for whom the feedback necessary 
for regret was not anticipated. On the other hand, the other-evaluation 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) was sustained. Publicizing subjects’ decisions, 
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which increased the likelihood of the evaluation of the decisions by 
others in the groups, significantly raised the level of ambiguity avoid- 
ance. 
That ambiguity avoidance obtained even for the low-other-evaluation 
conditions might suggest that at least one other source of ambiguity 
avoidance must be present. Although this may well be possible, the exis- 
tence of ambiguity avoidance in these conditions is not sufficient proof of 
this conjecture. Note that even the low-other-evaluation conditions have 
the necessary presence of the experimenter. The experimenter is a signif- 
icant other to most subjects. So, the experimenter’s presence may co- 
vertly influence a decision maker to behave in a manner that he or she 
believes will appear competent. Thus, the significant extent of ambiguity 
avoidance found even in the low-other-evaluation conditions is to be ex- 
pected under the other-evaluation hypothesis. 
EXPERIMENT 5 
Experiment 5 was designed as a test of the mistake hypothesis. The 
mistake hypothesis claims that in avoiding ambiguity subjects are exhib- 
iting a nonconscious bias. The prediction was that, if the situation were 
sufficiently understood, subjects would correct this bias. The procedure 
used was similar to that described by Slavic and Tversky (1974), and may 
be regarded as a replication of their study using different lotteries. The 
present experiment employed Lotteries 1 and 2 (Fig. l), with slight varia- 
tions as described below. If a subject’s ambiguity avoidance is due to a 
nonconscious bias, as the mistake hypothesis indicates, then the subject 
should react to the presentation of prescriptive counterarguments by al- 
tering his or her preferences. 
Method 
Subjects. Seventy undergraduates at the University of Michigan were 
recruited from several introductory psychology courses. The subjects 
were separated into three groups, each of which had the same tasks. 
They were not paid for their participation, but understood that one of 
them would be selected to play one of the lotteries in the experiment, 
receiving the outcome of that lottery. 
Procedure. The subjects’ tasks were to indicate their preferences 
among four bets. The bets were lotteries that were derived from Lotteries 
1 and 2. There were three differences between these bets and the lotteries 
in Fig. 1: (a) The winning amount was $10, rather than $5; (b) the chip 
colors used were blue and red, rather than white and red; and (c) the 
winning color was specified in the bet, rather than by the subject. The 
latter difference implied four bets from the two lotteries. In Bet Red 1, 
the subject was to select a chip at random from the nonambiguous Bag 1 
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and receive $10 if the chip was red, nothing if the chip was blue. In Bet 
Blue 1, the subject selected a chip at random from Bag 1, and received 
$10 for a blue chip, nothing for a red chip. Bet Red 2 and Bet Blue 2 were 
similarly defined using the ambiguous Bag 2 for the random drawing, with 
the winning color as specified. 
The bets were described in the first of two response booklets that were 
used. The subject’s task was to choose between bets. A pair of bets was 
offered, beginning with Bet Red 2 versus Bet Blue 2, and subjects indi- 
cated which they would prefer, or if they were indifferent. Thus, this was 
not a forced-choice task. Subjects then rated their strength of preference 
on a scale with endpoints labeled with the names of the two bets, and 
with the center labeled “Indifferent.” The strength of preference ratings 
were coded on a scale of 1 to 5 in the analyses. Following their responses 
to Bets Red 2 and Blue 2, the subjects responded to three more bet pairs: 
Bet Red 1 versus Bet Blue 1, Bet Red 1 versus Bet Red 2, and Bet Blue 1 
versus Bet Blue 2. Note that each of the first two bet pairs involved the 
same bag. These comparisons tested for the existence of a color prefer- 
ence between red and blue. The second two bet pairs involved the same 
color, but different bags; choices involving these bets tested for an ambi- 
guity preference. 
After the four sets of responses were elicited, the first response booklet 
was collected and the second one distributed. The purpose of the second 
booklet was to present arguments designed to influence subjects’ 
choices, to allow subjects to reconsider their stated preferences, and then 
to determine if their choices changed. The booklet described each of the 
bets, outlined the choices it required, and summarized arguments for two 
patterns of response to the last two bet pairs in the first booklet. It was 
these last two choice pairs that were repeated in the second booklet. The 
first response pattern was that of either ambiguity seeking or ambiguity 
avoidance; the second response pattern was that of ambiguity neutrality. 
The rationales given to the subject for the first response pattern argued 
for a consistent preference either for the nonambiguous bag in both 
choices (Pattern la) or for the ambiguous bag in both choices (Pattern 
lb). That is, Pattern 1 argued that subjects should react to ambiguity, 
either by avoiding it or seeking it. The rationale for the second response 
pattern presented the argument of statistical decision theory for indiffer- 
ence between the ambiguous and nonambiguous bags (Pattern 2). That is, 
Pattern 2 argued that subjects should not react to ambiguity, and should 
be indifferent between the lotteries in each pair. The rationales, as pre- 
sented to the subjects, are described in more detail in the Appendix. 
Following the presentation of the arguments, subjects were asked to 
reconsider the last two choices from the first response booklet. They 
were assured that they were not compelled to either change or stick to 
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their original decisions. After the responses were made, a subject from 
each session was chosen at random. One of the bet pairs was randomly 
selected, and the subject played the lottery for which he or she had indi- 
cated a preference, receiving the outcome of that lottery. This procedure 
had been explained to the subjects before the responses were requested. 
Results and Discussion 
The subjects did not exhibit any systematic color preferences, either in 
their responses to the first two bet pairs in the first response booklet, or 
in their response patterns to the remaining four bet pairs. We concen- 
trate, then, on the latter four bet pairs as tests of the mistake hypothesis. 
As Table 4 shows, only five times was there a switch from an ambiguity 
preference to ambiguity neutrality after the rationales were presented. 
One subject accounted for two of these switches, and three subjects 
made this switch only for the first of the two bet pairs. Furthermore, an 
almost equal number of times-four times-the opposite switch oc- 
curred; again with one subject providing two of these switches. Clearly, 
subjects tended to persist in their choices despite the arguments pre- 
sented, an observation that attained statistical significance (smaller x2[ I] 
= 18.64, p < .OOOl for each subtable in Table 4, after combining the 
neutral and seeking categories to obtain adequate cell sizes). Also ob- 
served was that subjects tended to avoid, rather than seek, ambiguity in 
both the first presentations (z = 3.84, n = 140, p < .OOl) and the second 
presentations (z = 3.07, n = 140, p < .Ol), in agreement with previous 
studies. 
The strength of preference ratings corroborated the choice data. The 
mean ratings for both bet pairs and both presentations are shown in Table 
5. This table also contains the mean difference between the first and 
second presentations of a nonindifference measure, NZ. For each subject 
for each bet pair, this measure was calculated as 
NZ = 1 Rating - 3.00 I. 
This value measures the extent to which the subject is not indifferent 
between the bets in that pair, irrespective of the direction of preference. 
Since indifference, which is expressed by a rating of 3.00, is the norma- 
tively predicted response, this measure is an index of subjects’ disagree- 
ment with the normative model of statistical decision theory. As Table 5 
indicates, there is significant ambiguity avoidance in both presentations, 
and there is no significant decrease in subjects’ nonindifference to ambi- 
guity between presentations as a result of exposure to arguments. 
The reluctance of subjects to change their behavior after the presenta- 
tion of a prescriptive counterargument in the present choice situation rep- 
licates the result which has been obtained in other choice situations in- 
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volving ambiguity (MacCrimmon, 1968; MacCrimmon & Larsson, 1979; 
Slavic & Tversky, 1974). The finding is in contrast to the prediction of the 
mistake hypothesis that subjects would not avoid ambiguity after the 
“mistake” was pointed out to them. It is not the case that subjects, upon 
reflection, will “correct” themselves after their “error” is highlighted 
and explained. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present line of experiments has moved toward filling a gap in the 
research on ambiguity. Our concern was with the question, “Why is am- 
biguity avoided?” We noted that, although numerous explanations have 
been advanced, the empirical support for each of these hypotheses was 
sparse. Given the prevalence of ambiguity in real-world decision situa- 
tions, a better understanding of people’s reactions to ambiguity was de- 
sired, and the present experiments have succeeded in advancing that 
goal. In particular, only one of the explanations that have been proposed, 
the other-evaluation hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), was supported. Further, 
the experiments verified the existence of the phenomenon of ambiguity 
avoidance, with approximately 70% of the subjects choosing the less am- 
biguous option overall, thereby exhibiting the characteristic ambiguity- 
avoiding behavior. 
On the basis of the present findings, the phenomenon of ambiguity 
avoidance is not attributable to a belief that the outcome-determination 
process is “hostile” (Hypothesis 1). It is not attributable to an antici- 
TABLE 5 
MEAN STRENGTH OF PREFERENCE RATINGS AND MEAN NONINDIFFERENCE MEASURE 
(NI) DIFFERENCE (EXPERIMENT 5) 
Bet Red 1 Bet Blue 1 
VS VS 
Bet Red 2 Bet Blue 2 
Mean rating, 
first presentation0 3.61** 3.41” 
Mean rating, 
second presentationa 3.34* 3.36* 
Mean NI difference, 
first-second 0.07 0.11 
a Compared to 3 = ambiguity neutrality, 1 = maximal ambiguity seeking, and 5 = max- 
imal ambiguity avoiding. 
*p < .05. 
**p < .OOl. 
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pated future self-evaluation of the decision (Hypothesis 3). It is not due 
to the eixstence of a lexicographic decision rule operating in a forced- 
choice task (Hypothesis 4). It is not related to a general avoidance of 
uncertainty of the type described by risk-aversion measures (Hypothesis 
5). And it is not a systematic error that subjects are willing to correct 
upon proper understanding (Mistake hypothesis). 
The phenomenon appears to result from an anticipation by decision 
makers that their decisions will be evaluated by others. The present ex- 
periment used only implicit evaluation, in that others merely observed 
the decision, but neither commented on it, nor concretely rewarded or 
punished it. Nevertheless, an effect was obtained. Thus, the decision 
maker avoids ambiguity in the belief that such a choice is most justifiable 
to others, that is, most socially acceptable. 
One limitation of the experiments leading to this finding is that many of 
them resulted in null conclusions, i.e., in the failure to reject the null 
hypotheses. As we stated, this was to be expected on the basis of the 
present state of knowledge regarding the sources of ambiguity reactions. 
Although not consistent with common practice in the reporting of experi- 
mental results, we believe the null findings to be at least as important as 
those rejecting the null hypotheses, an argument which has been pre- 
sented in detail by Greenwald (1975). Further, the validity of the null 
results is substantiated by the rejection of the null hypothesis in Experi- 
ment 4, and in the replication of the phenomenon of ambiguity avoidance 
throughout the experiments, In summary, the experiments support the 
psychological interpretation of other-evaluation as a feasible hypothesis 
both in that Experiment 4 showed an effect of manipulating an other-eval- 
uation factor, and in that no other proposed hypothesis was similarly 
substantiated. 
One interesting issue with respect to the other-evaluation hypothesis is 
why people would perceive an ambiguity-avoiding response as more jus- 
tifiable. A possibility is that subjects do so because they evaluate deci- 
sions on the basis of decision outcomes, and not on the basis of the deci- 
sion process. Accordingly, they anticipate that their own decisions will 
be so evaluated, and choose the nonambiguous option to avoid the OZQ- 
come of losing with an ambiguous bag that contains fewer than 50 win- 
ning chips. 
Another point of interest, mentioned earlier, is the normative issue 
surrounding ambiguity reactions, specifically, is ambiguity avoidance rea- 
sonable? In that much of our behavior is evaluated by others, the antici- 
pation of this evaluation in making a choice is not necessarily irrational. 
Thus, further investigation is warranted to illuminate this issue, possibly 
leading to the incorporation of ambiguity reactions into normative theo- 
ries of choice. 
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APPENDIX: ARGUMENTS PRESENTED TO SUBJECTS IN 
EXPERIMENT 5 
The following arguments were verbally presented to the subjects in 
Experiment 5; written summaries of the arguments were also included in 
the second response booklet, for referral while considering the choices 
required: 
Two common response patterns are offered by people faced with the 
last two choices that you considered in the first response booklet. Ratio- 
nales for each of these response patterns are now reviewed. 
Pattern 1 
In Decision Pattern 1, the person always chooses to bet on either Bag 1 
or Bag 2. The person argues that it is inappropriate to be indifferent be- 
tween Bet Red 1 and Bet Red 2 because it is unlikely that the two bags 
have the same composition. Similarly, it is inappropriate to be indifferent 
between Bet Blue 1 and Bet Blue 2 because the two bags are unlikely to 
have the same composition. Therefore, one of the following subpatterns 
should be used. 
In Pattern la, the person always prefers Bag 1 over Bag 2. Thus, the 
person chooses Bet Red 1 over Bet Red 2 because the number of red 
chips in Bag 2, being unspecified, might very well be less than 50, the 
number of red chips in Bag 1. Similarly, the person chooses Bet Blue 1 
over Bet Blue 2 because the number of blue chips in Bag 2, being un- 
specified, might be less than 50, the number of blue chips in Bag 1. 
In Pattern lb, the person always prefers Bag 2 over Bag 1. Thus, the 
person chooses Bet Red 2 over Bet Red 1 because the number of red 
chips in Bag 2, being unspecified might be more than 50, the number of 
red chips in Bag 1. Similarly, the person chooses Bet Blue 2 over Bet 
Blue 1 because the number of blue chips in Bag 2, being unspecified, 
might be more than 50, the number of blue chips in Bag 1. In either case, 
indifference is inappropriate, and one should always prefer drawing from 
either one bag or the other. 
Pattern 2 
In Decision Pattern 2, the person is indifferent between drawing from 
Bag 1 and drawing from Bag 2. The person argues that it is inappropriate 
to prefer one bag or the other. The rationales against a preference for 
either bag follow. 
Consider Pattern la. Suppose the person chooses Bet Red 1 over Bet 
Red 2. This implies that he or she thinks that there are fewer than 50 red 
chips in Bag 2, since Bag 1 contains 50 red chips for certain. Similarly, if 
the person chooses Bet Blue 1 over Bet Blue 2, this implies that he or she 
thinks that there are fewer than 50 blue chips in Bag 2, since Bag 1 con- 
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tains 50 blue chips for certain. But this is a contradiction. Bag 2 cannot 
both have less than 50 red chips and less than 50 blue chips. 
Now consider Pattern lb. If the person chooses Bet Red 2 over Bet 
Red 1, this implies that he or she thinks that there are more than 50 red 
chips in Bag 2, since Bag 1 contains 50 red chips for certain. Similarly, if 
the person chooses Bet Blue 2 over Bet Blue 1, this implies that he or she 
thinks that there are more than 50 blue chips in Bag 2, since Bag 1 con- 
tains 50 blue chips for certain. Again, this is a contradiction. Bag 2 cannot 
both have more than 50 red chips and more than 50 blue chips. 
In either case, a preference is inappropriate, and one should be indif- 
ferent between drawing from either one bag or the other. 
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